Alexander Dugin, a Russian political theorist, introduced the concept of a “sixth column” to describe individuals who, while appearing loyal to a government, steer decisions toward interests that diverge from the leader’s stated agenda. The term has been applied to internal divisions within the United States administration during Donald Trump’s presidency and to the outcomes of the 2026 U.S. midterm elections. Dugin distinguishes the fifth column from the sixth column. The fifth column consists of visible opposition groups that openly confront the government from outside its institutions. In Russia, figures such as Alexei Navalny are cited; in Venezuela, María Corina Machado; and in the United States, the Democratic Party. The sixth column, by contrast, operates from within the government. Its members repeat the official rhetoric and maintain an appearance of loyalty while quietly advancing external or personal agendas that conflict with the leader’s objectives. Dugin has named Russian businessman Anatoly Chubais as an example of a sixth‑column figure who appears to support President Vladimir Putin but in practice promotes liberal, pro‑Western positions. In Venezuela, he has pointed to Delcy Rodríguez, and in the United States he has cited close associates of Trump such as Lindsey Graham, Mark Levin, Laura Loomer, and pro‑Israel factions that push priorities distinct from the “America First” doctrine. The difference between the two columns lies in their location and method. The fifth column confronts from outside and is identifiable by its public statements and actions. The sixth column influences from inside, shaping outcomes through control of information, delays in decision‑making, and appointments to key positions. By determining what information reaches the leader and who implements the leader’s directives, the sixth column can alter policy without overt opposition. A February 2026 study by the European Council on Foreign Relations documented this dynamic within the Trump administration. The study found that various factions competed to influence the president’s foreign policy. JD Vance and allies pushed for reduced overseas commitments; Marco Rubio and others advocated a more active leadership role; Pete Hegseth and Pentagon officials prioritized competition with China and military resource concentration; and Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner favored negotiations and economic agreements. The resulting policies often differed from the president’s initial statements. The 2025 Iran incident illustrates the effect of internal competition. A faction of the MAGA movement, including Vice‑President JD Vance, favored avoiding new military intervention and pursuing a negotiated solution. Other groups pushed for increased pressure on Iran. Trump ultimately authorized attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, a decision that reportedly alienated part of his base and contributed to Republican losses in the 2026 midterms, according to post‑election reports. Dugin interprets this outcome as evidence of a sixth‑column influence within Trump’s circle, arguing that those who appeared loyal actually advanced agendas contrary to the “America First” promise. Dugin has also criticized Trump for deviating from the pledge to reduce external interventions, framing the analysis as part of a broader interest in a multipolar world order that would allow Russia to regain influence. The mechanisms described by Dugin are observable in many political systems, including the Dominican Republic, where the concept is not publicly used but the underlying dynamics can be analyzed. He identifies three key arenas: 1. The immediate power environment: individuals with direct access to the leader who filter information, delay decisions, or influence appointments while maintaining formal loyalty and repeating the official narrative. 2. Technical and economic bureaucracy: high‑level officials and specialists who can modify or slow policy implementation without openly opposing it, often due to technical assessments or ties to economic sectors. 3. Privileged economic sectors: business or financial groups that maintain close relationships with the government, finance or support it, and pressure for favorable tax, regulatory, or procurement decisions. In a system like the Dominican Republic, where alliances are fragile and power circles dense, internal control often outweighs visible opposition. The analytical question is not who constitutes the sixth column but who controls the information flow to the leader, who influences key appointments, and which interests benefit when strategic decisions are diluted or altered. Dugin’s sixth‑column framework offers a useful lens for examining how power can be shaped from within institutions. Disagreement does not equate to treason; treason requires deliberate coordination to block the leader’s project. Control over the decision‑making process determines whether the project is executed or transformed. Thus, power struggles occur not only with external opposition but, more effectively, among those already inside the system.
Article source: El Nuevo Diario | Image credit: El Nuevo Diario