Can the African Union Remain Relevant in Libya?

**African Union’s Role in Libya Faces Test as Peace Efforts Struggle to Take Hold**

*Tripoli, Libya* – Fifteen years after the 2011 uprising that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, Libya remains divided between rival eastern and western power centres. The ongoing fragmentation hampers national reconciliation, institutional unification and a democratic transition, while fueling arms trafficking, organised crime, irregular migration, terrorism and foreign fighter movements across the Sahel.

The African Union (AU) has long been a key actor in Libya’s peace process. Since February 2011 the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) has convened at least 20 meetings on the country, and the AU High‑Level Committee on Libya serves as the organisation’s main vehicle for an African‑led settlement. However, analysts argue that the AU’s influence may wane unless it can coordinate the implementation of existing peace initiatives.

### Recent Diplomatic Progress

In January 2025 the Presidential Council and the Government of National Unity in the west signed the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. Other groups joined the charter in February after the AU facilitated the agreement. The charter is seen as a significant diplomatic breakthrough, bringing together opposing power centres and framing the crisis as both political and societal.

Other milestones this year include:

* **11 April** – Rival administrations approved Libya’s first unified budget in more than a decade.
* **March** – A joint military exercise, facilitated by the United States, brought together top rival commanders.
* **30 August** – Adversaries agreed on a “landmark” roadmap to national elections within two years, mediated by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).
* **16 June** – A Libyan‑led tripartite agreement committed parties to simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections by 17 February 2027, established a sovereign oversight committee and outlined steps to end the transition.

AU Commission Chairperson Mahamoud Ali Youssouf welcomed the June agreement as a step toward constitutional order and reconciliation. In contrast, UN Secretary‑General Special Representative Hanna Tetteh did not mention the agreement in her 18 June remarks, instead prioritising the UNSMIL‑facilitated roadmap.

### Implementation Challenges

The PSC reiterated at its 9 June meeting that all foreign forces and mercenaries should withdraw and expressed concern over continued violations of the United Nations embargo, illicit fuel exports, armed clashes and deteriorating humanitarian conditions of African migrants in detention centres. The council recognised that Libya’s core challenge is not a lack of peace efforts but a persistent failure to implement existing agreements. At least nine major roadmaps or accords have been launched since 2011, yet they consistently collapse or stall at implementation.

Anas El Gomati of the Tripoli‑based Sadeq Institute noted, “Endorsement is not implementation.” He identified institutional and economic obstacles, noting that rival authorities in the east and west benefit politically and financially from maintaining parallel institutions, especially through controlling oil revenues and state resources. Oil revenues sustain competing security structures, administrations, judicial bodies and financial networks. El Gomati added that elections will not resolve the crisis without deeper institution‑building, public finance and security reforms.

External actors further complicate the situation. El Gomati pointed out that the United Arab Emirates has faced little consequence or mediation attention despite being the primary external military patron of Khalifa Haftar’s eastern‑aligned Libyan National Army (LNA) since 2016. LNA‑controlled territories also reportedly serve as a supply corridor for Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces. The PSC has rejected the presence of foreign forces, mercenaries and fighters, but the 5+5 Joint Military Commission—comprising military negotiators from both east and west—claims that fragmented security‑sector institutions hamper external force withdrawals.

### Overlapping Peace Initiatives

The UN roadmap, AU efforts and the tripartite agreement risk duplication and forum‑shopping. Greater coordination is deemed essential to transform recent diplomatic momentum into lasting impact. Implementation of the AU’s 2011 roadmap and high‑level committee decisions has been slow due to external interference, competing mediation tracks and internal constraints such as limited follow‑up capacity, resources and competing continental priorities.

The AU’s added value is evident in the 2025 National Reconciliation Charter, which has helped bridge Libya’s political and geographical divide. Unlike other actors focused on elections and institutions, the AU frames the crisis as both political and societal and prioritises national reconciliation, transitional justice and social cohesion. The AU also collaborated with Africa’s three UN Security

Article and image source: allafrica.com